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BARTERING WITH A NATION'S HEALTH OR
IMPROVING ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS? THE
UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT
Katherine M. Van Marent
Abstract: Providing access to affordable medicines and rewarding innovation
produces a difficult tension in the global economy. Different nations deal with this
tension differently, as illustrated by the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement
("U.S.-Australia FTA") negotiations. Both nations stood to benefit greatly from reduced
or eliminated tariffs. During negotiations, both nations sought to capitalize on the
opportunity to alter certain practices that hindered trade. One such practice was
Australia's fifty-five-year-old Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme ("PBS"). The PBS
controls prices for most medicines within Australia. Australian consumers are concerned
that the U.S.-Australia FTA will adversely affect access to affordable medicines because
free trade agreements are generally intended to remove tariffs as well as non-tariff
barriers to trade between the parties. This agreement, however, leaves Australia's
subsidization program intact. Similar concerns have been raised before, specifically in
Canada over the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFT'A"). Canada, however,
is still able to provide access to affordable, yet innovative drugs, even after NAF'A.
Australia will be able to do the same well after the U.S.-Australia FTA is fully
implemented. The provisions of the U.S.-Australia FITA are minor procedural changes
and do not substantively change how the PBS operates.
I. INTRODUCTION
A tension exists in the global economy between rewarding innovation
with economic incentives and providing universal access to effective
medicines. On the one hand, economic incentives encourage the creation of
new, life-saving drugs. On the other hand, making life-saving drugs
available and affordable to everyone who needs them is beneficial to society
as a whole. Different nations have addressed this tension in a multitude of
ways, from strong intellectual property protection to government-imposed
price controls, and from bulk purchasing agreements to open market
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competition.' Australia and the United States have historically approached
the tension differently with regard to pharmaceuticals.
Australia has dealt with the tension between rewarding innovation and
providing access to medicines through a universal subsidization scheme.
The program operates to ensure all Australians have timely access to
essential medicines.2 The PBS is grounded in social justice values and
designed to maximize health outcomes.3 The program uses its purchasing
power to lower drug costs, and subsidizes the cost of most medicines, so that
the Australian consumer is not paying a true market price.4 Typically,
subsidization is a protectionist measure in which a government pays a
domestic producer so that the producer's products are protected from
competition in the open market. 5 In this case, however, the purpose of the
subsidization is to protect the consumer from the open market by subsidizing
drug prices.6
By contrast, the United States has a longstanding history of using a
competitive market approach to contain drug CoStS. 7 This approach focuses
on the importance of economic incentives to encourage the development of
new drugs. Competitive markets8 allow pharmaceutical companies to
See INT'L. TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. OF COM., PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS IN OECD
COUNTRIES, IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSUMERS, PRICING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND
INNOVATION (2004), available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/drugpricingstudy (last visited May 31, 2005)
[hereinafter Price Control Report] (providing a report on eleven countries' methods of addressing this
tension). This report was prepared as required by section 1123 of the Medicare Prescription Drug
Modernization and Improvement Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 117 Stat. 2066.
2 See MAURICE RICKARD, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, THE PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME:
OPTIONS FOR COST CONTROL (May 28, 2002), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2001-
02/02cibl2.htm (last visited May 31, 2005).
3 See id. (asserting that access to medicines, both physical and financial, increases the level of
health in society).
4 See Clive Hamilton, Buddhima Lokuge, & Richard Denniss, Barrier to Trade or Barrier to
Profit? Why Australia's Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme Worries U.S. Drug Companies, 4 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 373, 375, 378 (2004).
5 JOAN EDELMAN SPERO & JEFFREY A. HART, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 386 (Beth Gillett ed., St. Martin's Press 1997) (1977).
6 See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING, ABOUT THE PBS,
available at www.health.gov.au/intemet/wcms/publishing.nsf/content/health-pbs-general-aboutus.htm (last
visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter ABOUT THE PBS].
7 See PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA (PHRMA), Q & A TOUGH
QUESTIONS, STRAIGHT ANSWERS (2004), at http://www.phrma.orglpublications/publications//2004-08-
20.1049.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005) (asserting that "the United States contains costs through the use of
a competitive market" and that government controls may reduce or delay access to specific drugs).
8 There are no universal subsidization programs offered by the U.S federal government for
pharmaceuticals. In fact, the Medicare Prescription Drug Modernization and Improvement Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, §1860D-1 1(i), explicitly reaffirms the role of competition and forbids the Secretary of
Health and Human Services from interfering with negotiations between drug manufacturers and pharmacies
or instituting a price structure for the reimbursement of Medicare Part D drugs. See TERRI SHAW, CENTER
FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: HARNESSING MEDICARE'S PURCHASING POWER,
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maximize profits in order to reinvest them in research and development. 9
The U.S. government has made it known that it wants competitive markets
to prevail worldwide and endeavors to accomplish this goal through several
means, including free trade agreements.'
0
Given these differences, it was no surprise that the onset of
negotiations for a free trade agreement between Australia and the United
States triggered concern among stakeholders in both countries regarding the
agreement's potential impact on pharmaceuticals. The removal of non-tariff
barriers such as government purchasing practices is just as important to a
successful free trade agreement as the removal of tariffs. II The United
States perceived the PBS subsidy as a non-tariff barrier to trade,12 but
Australia did not.
Although both governments publicize the benefits of the U.S.-
Australia FTA to their respective economies and citizens,' 3 Australian
consumers remain concerned 14 that the U.S.-Australia FTA will negatively
impact the PBS and their ability to obtain affordable medicines. However,
the free trade agreement neither eliminated the PBS, nor made any
substantive changes to it.
Jan. 28, 2004, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ80VF&b=
2 489 0 (last
visited May 31, 2005).
9 See Price Control Report, supra note I at vii. See also Gregory J. Glover, Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, Part H1, PhRMA (Mar. 19, 2002) available at http://www.phrma.org/actions/
printFriendlyPage.cfm?t=46&r=432 (last visited May 31, 2005) (asserting that companies need exclusivity
period in order to raise the money to pay for research and development).
15 See generally Price Control Report, supra note 1.
" DAVID N. BALAAM & MICHAEL VESETH, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLmCAL ECONOMY
233 (Laura Pearson ed., Prentice Hall 2001).
12 See Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR"), U.S.-AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT-QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT PHARMACEUTICALS (July 8, 2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/FactSheets/2004fU.S.-AustraliaFree-_TradeAgreement_--
_Questions._Answers_AboutPharmaceuticals.htm (last visited May 31, 2005); Elizabeth Becker & Robert
Pear, Trade Agreement May Undercut Importing of Inexpensive Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 24, 2004.
13 See Media Release, The Honorable Mark Vaile, MP, Minister for Trade, Australia, Historic Free
Trade Agreement Begins Today (Jan. 1, 2005), available at http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/
2005/mvt00O1 05.html (last visited May 31, 2005) (claiming that the free trade agreement is worth billions
of dollars); Press Release, USTR, United States and Australia Sign Free Trade Agreement, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2004/May/United-States-Australia-Sign-Free-Tr
adeAgreement.html (last visited May 31, 2005) (declaring this free trade agreement as "the most
significant immediate reduction of industrial tariffs ever achieved in a U.S. free trade agreement.").
14 See e.g., Drug Companies Want FTA Changes, AAP, Oct. 21, 2004 (noting concern about drug
companies ceasing research and development in Australia); Ken Harvey, Thomas A. Faunce, Buddhima
Lokuge, & Peter Drahos, Will the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement Undermine the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme?, eMJA, July 25, 2004, available at http://www.mja.com.au/public/rop/
ausfta/harl0408fm.html (last visited May 31, 2005) (discussing several trade agreement provisions that
threaten the PBS); Jason Frenkel, More New Medicines, But at a Price, HERALD SUN, Feb. 10, 2004, at 5
(suggesting the price of pharmaceuticals will rise because of the trade agreement).
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A similar situation existed between the United States and Canada prior
to Canadian free trade agreements with the United States. Like Australia,
Canada sought to protect its citizens from high drug prices and faced
pressure from the American drug industry.15 Although the free trade
agreements changed how Canada maintained low drug prices, Canada is still
able to control the price of patented pharmaceuticals. The changes to the
Canadian system under the free trade agreements were more extensive than
those under the U.S.-Australia FTA, yet Canadian consumers still have
access to affordable medicines.' 7 Judging from the limited impact of the
U.S.-Canada free trade agreements on drug prices in Canada, the minor
changes to the PBS in the U.S.-Australia FTA should not impact Australia's
ability to ensure access to affordable medicines.' 8
This Comment asserts that the U.S.-Australia FTA will not harm the
Australian consumer's ability to obtain affordable drugs through the PBS.
Part II discusses the background of the Australian PBS subsidization
program. Part III explores the Canadian system of ensuring access to
affordable medicines before the free trade agreements and demonstrates its
similarities with the Australian approach. Part IV compares the free trade
agreement's effect on the Canadian pharmaceutical market with the likely
effect of the U.S.-Australia FrA on Australian pharmaceuticals. It also
discusses the U.S.-Australia FTA modifications to the PBS and argues that
these changes, along with Australia's influential public opinion, will ensure a
minimal impact on the price of drugs in Australia.
15 See e.g., Letter from Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) to USTR (last
updated Sept. 18, 2000) available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/phrma/30l-00/canada.html (last
visited May 31, 2005) (urging the United State government to list Canada as a Priority Watch Country
because of its failure to offer acceptable patent protection for pharmaceuticals) [hereinafter Letter from
PhRMA to USTRI.
16 See discussion infra Part III.
17 This is primarily accomplished through the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board ("PMPRB").
See PMPRB ANN. REP. 3 (2002), available at http://www.pmprb.conCMFiles/ar2002e21LEF-6252003.
6142.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005) ("The PMPRB protects consumers and contributes to Canadian health
care by ensuring that prices charged by manufacturers for patented medicines are not excessive."). See also
infra Part IIIC. (discussing the PMPRB in more detail).
18 See Phillip Davies, Deputy Secretary, Department of Health & Aging, Remarks at the AUSFrA
Conference (Mar. 1-2, 2004), at http://www.apec.org.au/docs/fta04Davies.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005).
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II. THE AUSTRALIAN SYSTEM OF PROVIDING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE
DRUGS WAS EFFECTIVE BEFORE THE U.S.-AUSTRALIA FTA WAS
IMPLEMENTED
Before the U.S.-Australia FTA, Australia managed consumer access to
affordable drugs through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme ("PBS"). 19
The PBS maintains this role post-U.S.-Australia FTA. Australia passed the
National Health Act [of] 1953 that recognized access to essential medicines
as a priority and created the PBS. 20 The PBS employs an extensive process
for listing and pricing high-quality medicines.2 1 This process ensures access
to low-priced medicines, both patented and generic versions. 22  Before the
U.S.-Australia FTA, the PBS was so effective the World Health Organization
hailed the PBS as a benchmark by which other countries' health programs
23
should be measured. Similarly, the PBS was "regarded as the 'gold
standard"' of medicine-access programs worldwide.
24
A. The Goal of the PBS Is to Ensure Access to Affordable Drugs
The PBS seeks, primarily, to ensure that all Australians have reliable,
timely, and affordable access to new, expensive, therapeutic drugs. 25  The
PBS first offered benefits in 1948.26 Initially, the PBS supplied a limited
number of life-saving or disease-preventing drugs free of charge.27  The
program has grown significantly and now provides subsidized access to
19 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & AGEING, FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, available at http://www.health.gov.au/internet/wcms/publishing.nsf/Content/health-pbs
general-faq.htm-copy2#about2_0 (last visited May 31, 2005).
20 National Health Act, 1953, § 85 (Austl.). See ABOUT THE PBS supra note 6 (noting the operations
of the PBS are embodied in Part VII of the National Health Act 1953).
21 See Centre for International Economics, Economic Analysis of AUSFTA, §4, available at
http:llwww.dfat.gov.aultrade/negotiations/us-fta/economic-analysis-report/ (last visited May 31, 2005)
(describing the several steps drug taken by manufacturers to have a drug listed and priced with the PBS)
[hereinafter Economic Analysis]; see also infra Part H.B (describing the process of listing and pricing a
drug on the PBS).
22 See AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT LIBRARY, DR. KATE BURTON & JACOB VARGHESE, THE PBS AND
THE AUSTRALIA-US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, No. 3, July 21, 2004, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/
library/pubs/m12004-05105rn03.pdf [hereinafter PBS & AUSFTA].23 Janaki Kremmer, Australia's Low-Cost Drugs Threatened By US Trade Deal, CHRISTIAN SCL
MONITOR, Aug. 16, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File.
24 Drug Spat Stalls Australia-US Free Trade Deal, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Aug. 4, 2004. But see
Taxes Foot Drug Scheme Mark-up, HERALD SUN, Apr. 22, 2003, at 8.
25 ABOUT THE PBS, supra note 6.
26 AMANDA BIGGS, PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, THE PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME-AN
OVERVIEW (Jan. 2, 2003), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguideSP/pbs.htm (last visited May
31, 2005) [hereinafter PBS OVERVIEW].
27 See id. (containing a summary of the evolution of the PBS).
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approximately 600 prescription medications,28 which equates to about eighty
percent of all prescribed drugs.2 9  The subsidization by the Australian
government is so substantial that for every dollar a patient spends, the PBS
spends five. 30  The PBS also caps the cost of prescriptions for specific
populations including chronically-sick people who require multiple
prescriptions, and pensioners. 31  Non-pensioners' cost per prescription is
lowered after their annual prescription costs exceed a certain amount.
32
This system is expensive, costing the government more than AUS
$5.6 billion per year.33 In 2003, the PBS was the fastest growing area of
health expenditure. 34  The cost of the PBS rose by an average expenditure
growth rate of around fourteen percent each year between 1992 and 2002.3s
The increase is attributable to several factors, including increasingly
expensive new drugs listed through the PBS, over-prescribing by physicians,
consumer expectations, the aging population of Australia, and aggressive
marketing by the pharmaceutical industry.36  Nonetheless, the PBS saves
Australia about AUS $1-$2.5 billion through its listing and pricing
strategy.
37
B. The PBS Drug Listing and Pricing System Helps to Meet the Goal of
Ensuring Access to Affordable Drugs
The thorough process for listing a drug with the PBS keeps drug
prices low.38 Before a drug manufacturer can apply to have a drug listed, the
Australian Drug Evaluation Committee ("ADEC") must approve it.3 9 ADEC
28 Peter Sainsbury, Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement and the Australian
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHics 387, 388 (2004). It is difficult to
determine the number of drugs listed because drugs come in many forms and strengths, and are listed under
various brand names. Id.
29 ABOUT THE PBS, supra note 6. On average, this is eight prescriptions per person in Australia. Id.
30 PBS OVERVIEW, supra note 26. Pensioners include "part pensioners, Veterans Affairs
beneficiaries, sickness allowees and other older long-term allowees, including parenting allowees over 60
and receiving income support for at least 9 months." Id.
31 ' 
.
32 Id.
33 ABOUT THE PBS, supra note 6.
34 PBS OVERVIEW, supra note 26.
35 See RICKARD, supra note 2.
36 See id. (listing 8 reasons for the increase in cost).
37 Sainsbury, supra note 28, at 389 (compared to the United States).
38 The following describes the process in existence prior to the FTA, which for the most part still
exists post-FrA. For procedural changes resulting from the conclusion of US-Australian PTA, see infra
Part IV.
39 PBS OVERVIEW, supra note 26. The Therapeutic Goods Administration is analogous to the U.S.
Food & Drug Administration. See Hamilton, Lokuge, & Denniss supra note 4 (calling the Therapeutic
Goods Administration and the Food & Drug Administration rough equivalents).
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is a part of the Therapeutic Goods Administration. 40 This committee
evaluates a drug for its safety, quality, and efficacy.4' Once approved by
ADEC, a manufacturer may market and sell the drug to the public without
being listed on the PBS. However, at this stage, the PBS will not subsidize
its cost.
42
After ADEC approval, there are two primary reasons a drug sponsor
3
would be interested in listing its product with the PBS. First, if a drug is on
the list, the PBS will subsidize its price, making the price closer or equal to
alternative drugs also listed with the PBS.44 Drugs that are not subsidized do
not sell well in Australia because they are more expensive than their
subsidized alternatives.4 5  Second, the PBS orders listed drugs in large
quantities, which results in transactional cost savings to the manufacturer as
well as stability and reliability.
46
For a drug to become listed on the PBS, the sponsor must first apply
to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee ("PBAC") for
assessment.47 The PBAC evaluates the drug for its therapeutic value, and
compares its cost effectiveness with existing treatments.48 The drug's
manufacturer submits information to assist in this evaluation, including
clinical trial data and the manufacturer's requested price.4 9 The PBAC then
determines whether the drug will be listed with the PBS.50
After a drug has cleared the PBAC process and is approved for listing,
the Minister for Health and Ageing refers it to the Pharmaceutical Benefits
40 PBS OVERVIEW, supra note 26.
41 See RICKARD, supra note 2.
42 For a discussion on the pricing process of the PBS, see infra Part II.C.
43 A sponsor is usually the drug company, but could also be a medical body, health professionals, or
private individuals and their representatives. See PBS OVERVIEW, supra note 26.
44 See ABOUT THE PBS, supra note 6.
45 Clara Pirani, Leaders Face Challenge on Trade Threat to PBS, THE AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 27, 2004,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File (stating that "[miedicines not subsidized by the scheme sell poorly
in Australia, so it is better for a drug company to have its product on the list even though their profit margin
is reduced.").
46 See Sainsbury, supra note 28, at 390; DR. MAURICE RICKARD, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, FREE
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, THE PBS, AND PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES (Feb. 10, 2004), available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rn12003-04/04m32.htm (last visited May 31, 2005).
41 See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING, OUTCOMES OF PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ("PBAC") MEETINGS, available at http://www.health.gov.au/intemet/wcms/
publishing.nsf/Content/health-pbs-general-outcomes.htm (last visited May 31, 2005).
48 National Health Act, 1953 §101 (3A) (Austl.).
49 See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING, GUIDELINES FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY ON
PREPARATION OF SUBMISSIONS TO THE PBAC: PART II, available at http://www.health.gov.au/internet/
wcms/publishing.nsf/Content/health-pbs-general-pubs-pharmpac-part2.htm (last visited May 31, 2005).
5
o See PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22. There is no formal threshold, but generally if the additional
cost per life-year gained for a drug is less than AUS $42,000 (1998/99 values) it is approved, while drugs
with a cost per life-year gained that exceed AUS $76,000 are not approved. See Sainsbury, supra note 28
at 389.
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Pricing Authority ("Pricing Authority"), 5' the agency responsible for pricing
all drugs listed with the PBS.52 The Pricing Authority then recommends to
Australia's Department of Health the price it should offer to pay the sponsor
(usually the manufacturer) for the drug. 3 The price is determined after the
Pricing Authority considers a list of factors, including the clinical and cost
effectiveness, the prices of alternate brands already on the market, the level
of activity undertaken by the company in Australia (including new
investment, research and development), and overseas prices. 54 If a new drug
does not have added benefits over an already listed drug, it is offered for the
same price as the listed drug.55 The Pricing Authority also recommends
volume arrangements in order to lower the price. 56 This allows the PBS to
use the bargaining power it gains from ordering in large quantities to reduce
the price to be paid to the manufacturer.57 If the manufacturer agrees with
the recommended price, the drug is then added to the PBS list.58  If,
however, the drug's sponsor does not agree with the offered price, it can
appeal to the Pricing Authority or the PBAC for reconsideration, or offer (or
continue to offer) the drug on the open market.59
In addition to setting the price paid to the manufacturer, the PBS also
sets the subsidized purchase price for the consumer.60 Thus, the drug the
consumer buys has been subjected to two levels of price reduction: quantity
discount and govemment subsidization.6 1 If a drug manufacturer does not
list a drug with the PBS, the manufacturer can sell the drug on the open
market, but it will compete with subsidized drugs. This is unlikely to be
51 See Economic Analysis, supra note 21.
52 See PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22.
53 PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS PRICING AUTHORITY ANN. REP. 4 (2003), available at
http://www.health.gov.au/intemnet/wcms/publishing.ns f/Content/health-pbs-general-pricing-pbparpt03 .htm
(last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter PBPA ANN. REP.].
54 Id. The Pricing Authority also reviews prices to recommend adjustments. Id.
55 See Kremmer, supra note 23.
56 See KEN HARVEY, THE PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME UNDER THREAT, available at
http://home.vicnet.net.au/-hissuesfTextHarvey4.doc (last visited May 31, 2005) (reporting that the PBS
purchases about ninety percent of prescription drugs).
" See id. at 2.
58 See PBS & AUSFrA, supra note 22.
'9 See id.
60 See ABOUT THE PBS, supra note 6.
61 See Dr. K. Lokuge & Richard Denniss, Trading in Our Health System? The Impact of the
Australia-US Free Trade Agreement on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, at x (The Australian Institute
Discussion Paper Number 55, 2003), available at http://www.tai.org.au/PublicationsFiles/DPFiles/
DP55suma.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005). "By design, the PBS combines the buying power of the
government with extensive cost-effectiveness analysis to ensure that Australians pay the lowest reasonable
price for their pharmaceuticals." Id.
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lucrative for the drug manufacturer, especially if there is an alternative drug
on the market that is subsidized through the PBS.
C. Generic Versions of Drugs Are Easier to List with the PBS Than
Patented Versions, Resulting in Further Price Reductions for the
Consumer
It is easier to list a generic drug with the PBS than to list its patented
62
counterpart. 2 The PBS simplified the application for approval of generic
drugs through a process called "springboarding." 63 Springboarding allows a
generic drug manufacturer to use the test data of the patent holder in its
application for marketing approval by the Therapeutic Goods
Administration.64 Springboarding makes the approval process cheaper and
easier for a generic drug applicant, because the applicant does not have to
invest the time or resources in developing its own test data. 65 Instead,
generic drug applicants can take advantage of the work of the patented
manufacturer.
66
Once approved by the Therapeutic Goods Administration, the generic
drug producer may choose to apply to PBAC and the Pricing Authority for
listing and pricing and be ready to enter the market the moment the patent
expires.67 As mentioned previously, the PBAC evaluates the drug for its
therapeutic value and compares its cost effectiveness with existing
68treatments. A generic version of an existing PBS drug has essentially the
same therapeutic value and is more cost efficient for the PBS program; thus,
it becomes a likely candidate for approval.69 Not only is a generic drug
more likely to be approved, but it costs less than a brand-name drug because
of the lack of research and development CoStS. 70  Furthermore, once the
PBAC recommends a generic drug to the Pricing Authority, the price offered
to the generic producer will be less than that offered to the patent holder.71
62 See PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22. For an explanation of how the FTA impacts the generic
market, see infra Part IV.C.
63 See id.
64 See NICHOLAS TYACKE, THE IMPACT OF THE US FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ON THE GENERIC
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND THE PBS, THE SKY IS NOT FALLING 6-7 (2004), available at
http://www.claytonutz.com/downloads/FrA-ArticleAugO4.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005).
65 PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22.
66 id.
67 id.
68 See Economic Analysis, supra note 21.
69 See Sainsbury, supra note 28 at 389.70 See Maria Moscaritolo & Paul Starick, Drug Patents, Finding the Right Dose, THE ADVERTISER,
Aug. 5, 2004 at 21.
71 See PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22.
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A generic medicine's entry into the market is facilitated by its cost
savings for both the government and the consumer.72 Generic drugs cost
less, and therefore save both the PBS and consumers money.73 The influx of
generic drugs, which are cheaper to produce than their patented counterparts,
forces a decrease in the price of the patented alternatives.74 By making it
easier for generic drugs to be on the PBS list, the PBS system helps ensure
that low-priced drugs are available to the Australian consumer. In addition
to subsidization measures, the goal of providing low-cost pharmaceuticals to
the consumer is met by allowing generic drugs to enter the market.
III. FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS SUBSTANTIVELY CHANGED How CANADA
ACHIEVES ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE MEDICINES, BUT CANADA CAN
STILL CONTROL PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES
Before entering into free trade agreements with the United States,75
Canada ensured access to affordable, innovative medicines primarily by
promoting generic versions of drugs. Like Australia, Canada sought to meet
its goal of providing its citizens with access to affordable medicines in part
by favoring generic drugs in its pharmaceutical licensing policies.76 The
difference was in how the two nations actually promoted generics. While
Australia used and still uses springboarding,77 Canada promoted generics on
the market through its patent laws.78 Canada expedited the entry of generics
into its market by allowing for compulsory licenses of the patented drug to a
generic manufacturer and by issuing shorter patent rights protection. 79 Now,
72 See Moscaritolo & Starick, supra note 70 at 21.
73 See PHARMACEUTICAL SOCIETY OF AUSTRALIA, PHARMACY SELF CARE, GENERIC MEDICINES
(BRAND CHOICE - PRICE OPTIONS), June 2003, available at http://www.nationalpharmacies.com.au/
advice cards/fact%20card%20PDFs/GENERICSFACTCARD_03.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005).
74 PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22.
75 Two free trade agreements between the United States and Canada influenced the way Canada
regulated pharmaceuticals: the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1987 and NAFTA in 1993. See infra
Parts III. B-C.
76 See Mary Atkinson, Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals: A Comparative Study of the Law in
the United States and Canada, 11 PAC. RiM L. & POL'Y. 181, 190 (2002); Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal
Network, Evolution of Canadian Law on Pharmaceutical Pricing, available at http://www.aidslaw.ca/Main
content/issues/cts/DrugPricingE/evolution.htm (last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter Evolution of
Canadian Law].
77 See supra Part II.C (describing springboarding).
78 See Patricia I. Carter, Federal Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States and Canada, 21
LOY. L.A. INT'L COMP. L.J. 215, 241 (1999).
79 See Atkinson, supra note 76, at 191.
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Canada primarily uses a central control mechanism similar to Australia's
PBS, called the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board ("PMPRB").
80
A. Compulsory Licenses Ensured Access to Innovative and Affordable
Medicines in Canada
Before Canada negotiated any free trade agreements with the United
States it used a compulsory license system to ensure that generics would be
available on the market so consumers could have access to affordable, yet
innovative, pharmaceuticals. 8  In 1923, Canada limited exclusive
pharmaceutical patent rights by allowing drug manufacturers to obtain
compulsory licenses.82  A compulsory license forces the patent holder to
allow the licensee to manufacture and market the patented drug before the
patent expires.83 Canadian generic drug manufacturers applied for a license
from the Commissioner of Patents to manufacture and market a generic
counterpart to a patented drug before the patent had expired.84
In 1969, Canada removed the domestic manufacturer requirement,
opening the door for non-domestic manufacturers to obtain a license,
produce a generic drug outside of Canada, and sell the drug on the Canadian
market.85 The generic producer simply had to notify the patent holder in
order to obtain a license.86 The patent holder's royalty fee was as only four
percent of the licensee's selling price. 87 Compulsory licensing only applied
to patented pharmaceuticals not exploited by a patent holder within three
years of the patent issue date.88 This licensing system effectively shortened
a patent's length and reduced the patent holder's market power by
g0 PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES REVIEW BOARD, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, available at
http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/english/view.asp?x=272 (last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter PMPRB
FAQ's].
81 See Lars Noah, NAFTA's Impact on the Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1293, 1300
(1997).
8 See Christopher Scott Harrison, Protection of Pharmaceuticals as Foreign Policy: The Canada-
U.S. Trade Agreement and Bill C-22 Versus the North American Free Trade Agreement and Bill C-91, 26
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 457, 506 (2001).
83 See Carter, supra note 78, at 241.
84 See Atkinson, supra note 76, at 191.
" See id.
86 See Ryan H. Flax, NAFTA & the Patent Systems of Its Members: Is There Potential for a
Unification of the North American Patent Systems?, 5 NAFTA: LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE
AMERICAS 461, 470 (1999).
'7 See James M. Silbermann, The North American Free Trade Agreement's Effect on
Pharmaceutical Patents: A Bitter Pill to Swallow or a Therapeutic Solution?, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 607, 622 (1996).
'8 See Arlene Nolan Farolan, Harmonization of the Patent Systems of NAFTA Nations, 10-SUM
CURRENTS: INT'LTRADE L.J. 54, 61 (2001); Flax, supra note 86, at 476.
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diminishing one of the biggest benefits of a patent-market exclusivity.89
These licenses drove down the price of patented drugs and saved Canadian
consumers millions of dollars.9° Until 1987, this program produced some of
the lowest consumer drug prices among developed nations. 91
B. The U.S-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1987 Weakened Canada's
Compulsory License System
As early as 1982, the United States targeted Canada's compulsory
license system as a trade issue because of the pharmaceutical industry's
complaints that it was threatening profitability.92 Compulsory licenses were
a contested issue in the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement negotiations.93
In 1987, in response to pressure from the United States during the trade
agreement negotiations, Canada passed Bill C-22 that strengthened patent
holder rights and weakened the compulsory license system.
94
Bill C-22 introduced different time frames for issuing compulsory
licenses deRending on the situation.95 The time frames ranged from seven to
ten years. A generic drug producer manufacturing and selling a
pharmaceutical domestically could apply for a compulsory license seven
years after the issue date, provided the patent holder invented the drug
outside of Canada.97 However, a generic drug producer had to wait until ten
years after the issue date to apply for a compulsory license if the producer
only wanted to import the medicine instead of manufacturing it within
Canada.98 This new structure encouraged domestic generic manufacturing.
99
The changes in Bill C-22 went beyond amending the compulsory
licensing system and extended modifications to the patent system. Notably,
the legislation extended the length of the patent to twenty years from the
89 See Carter, supra note 78, at 241.
90 See id. at 241; Harrison, supra note 82, at 457 ("[An] economist Harry Eastman found that
compulsory licensing saved Canadian consumers $ 211 million each year.").
91 Harrison, supra note 82, at 457.
9' See id. at 508-09.
93 See Carter, supra note 78, at 242.
94 An Act to Amend the Patent Act and Provide for Certain Matters In Relation Thereto, C. Gaz. ch.
41 (1987) (Can.) [hereinafter 1987 Patent Amendment]. See also Evolution of Canadian Law, supra note
76. But see Harrison, supra note 82, at 519 (quoting Canada's Finance Minister who insisted that Bill C-22
"was not ... related to the free trade agreement.").
95 1987 Patent Amendment, supra note 94, at ch. 41.11 (2)(a).
96 id.
97 Id. See Evolution of Canadian Law, supra note 76, at *8.
98 See 1987 Patent Amendment, supra note 94, at ch. 41.11 (2)(c). See also Evolution of Canadian
Law, supra note 76, at *8.
99 See Evolution of Canadian Law, supra note 76, at *8.
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date of filing.'00 Bill C-22 also allowed issuance of patents for medicines
themselves, rather than just patenting the process for creating the
medicines.' 0 This new provision favored patent holders in two ways. First,
it closed a loophole that allowed generic drug manufacturers to produce a
patented drug via a different process. Second, it permitted a patent holder to
not only protect the process of creating the drug, but also to protect the drug
itself.
Before this free trade agreement, the crux of Canada's system was the
use of compulsory licenses, which encouraged generic drugs producers to
enter the market. 1 2 To monitor a potential increase in drug prices due to the
changes to the compulsory licensing system, Canada established the PMPRB
with limited powers. 0 3  PMPRB was an independent body charged with
overseeing drug prices.' 4 If the PMPRB found that a patent holder charged
excessive prices, it could remove the protection against compulsory
licensing.
0 5
C. Pressure by the United States During NAFTA Negotiations Caused
More Changes to the Canadian System
During the U.S.-Canada NAFTA negotiations, Canada made more
changes to its laws relating to drugs under pressure from the United
States.0 6  Compulsory licenses were still an issue and NAFTA further
limited their use. 10 7 Instead of liberally granting licenses to generic drug
applicants whenever they met the conditions of Bill C-22, NAFrA tightened
the rein by requiring that license requests be considered individually.10 8
Under NAFTA, a manufacturer could obtain a license only if several terms
10o 1987 Patent Amendment, supra note 94, at ch. 46. Previously the patent length had been only
seventeen years. See Evolution of Canadian Law, supra note 76, at *7.101 1987 Patent Amendment, supra note 94, at ch. 14. See Evolution of Canadian Law, supra note 76,
at *7.
:02 See Evolution of Canadian Law, supra note 76, at *7.
03 1987 Patent Amendment, supra note 94, at ch. 41.18. See Evolution of Canadian Law, supra note
76, at *8.
104 PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES REVIEw BOARD, ABouT THE PMPRB, available at
http://www.pmprb-cepmb.gc.ca/englishlView.asp?x=175&mp=87 (last visited May 31, 2005) thereinafter
ABouT THE PMPRB].
105 CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL, PATENTED MEDICINE PRICES REVIEW BOARD, http://www.aids
law.ca/Maincontent/issues/cts/e-info-dp-03.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter PATENTED
MEDICINES].
1o6 See, e.g., Letter from PhRMA to USTR, supra note 15. See also Evolution of Canadian Law,
supra note 76.
1"7 See NAFrA §1709 (7), Dec. 17, 1992, available at http://www.tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/
Nafta/00.CONTENTS (last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter NAFrA]. See Evolution of Canadian Law,
supra note 76, at *6.
108 See NAFrA, supra note 107, § 1709 (10) (a); Silbermann, supra note 87, at 626.
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were met, including: 1) the generic manufacturer seeking a license had
unsuccessfully requested authorization from the patent holder on reasonable
commercial terms;'09 2) the license was limited to a specific scope and
duration;11° 3) the use was nonexclusive; 111 and 4) the license terminated
when the circumstances that made it necessary ceased or became unlikely to
recur in the future. 112  Some Canadians were worried that changing the
compulsory license system would cause drug prices to rise."
3
Despite the changes made in compliance with free trade
agreements,1 14 Canada still effectively controls the price of patented drugs
through the PMPRB. 115 In response to the decreased use of compulsory
licenses and the additional requirements of NAFTA, in 1993 the PMPRB
received additional authority to regulate patented drug prices." 6  After
NAFTA, the powers of the PMPRB increased from simply monitoring prices
and using compulsory licenses as a tool for regulating prices, to actually
having the power to reduce wholesale prices of patented medicines when
they are excessive.!
17
To determine if a price is excessive, the PMPRB compares the drug's
price to the median price of the same drug on a specific list of developed
nations.11 8 These nations are listed in the Patented Medicines Regulations
and include France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.1 9  The PMPRB regulates prices
continuously and prices cannot increase by more than the Consumer Price
Index annually. 120  After an investigation, if the PMPRB finds a price
excessive, it can order a price reduction and hold the manufacturer liable for
double the excess revenues reaped during the period of the excessive
• • 121
pricmg.
'09 Id. §1709 (10) (b). This requirement could be waived in cases of national emergency, extreme
urgenc, or public noncommercial use. Id.
o See id. §1709 (10) (c).
See id. §1709 (10) (d).
2 Id. §1709 (10) (g).
113 See NAFTA Threatens Canadian Consumers, CANADA NEWSWIRE, Feb. 9, 1993, LEXIS, News
Group File.
114 See Farolan, supra note 88, at 61 ("In order to comply with this [NAFFA] provision, Canada
eliminated its compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals ... .
115 Atkinson, supra note 76, at 192.
116 Carter, supra note 78, at 245-46.
117 PMPRB FAQ'S, supra note 80.
118 Id.
119 Id.
'0 Id.
121 ABOUT THE PMPRB, supra note 104.
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The Canadian PMPRB and the Australian PBS offer a valid
comparison to each other. Like the Australian PBS, the Canadian PMPRB
protects consumers by ensuring that patented pharmaceuticals are not sold at
excessive prices.122 Unlike the PBS, which lists and prices both patented
and generic drugs, the PMPRB's authority over drug prices is limited to
patented drugs. 123 The PMPRB sets limits on prices that manufacturers can
charge their wholesalers, but, unlike the PBS, it does not set the price at
which the drug is sold to consumers.124 Similar to the PBS, the PMPRB
compares the wholesale price to both the price of existing drugs that treat the
same disease and the price of the drug in other countries.125 The main
similarity between these two programs is their common overarching goal to
ensure access to affordable medicines.
D. Trade Agreements Substantively Changed Canadian Patent Law, But
Canada Is Still Able to Ensure Access to Affordable Patented Drugs
The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA substantively
changed how Canada provides access to affordable medicines, but they did
not undermine Canada's ability to control drug prices. Instead of using
compulsory licenses, Canada now uses the PMPRB to ensure access to
affordable drugs. Canada's PMPRB ensures that patented drugs are not sold
at excessive prices. 126 Nearly every year since the PMPRB was created, the
manufacturer's gate prices 12 7 increased less than the Consumer Price
Index. 128 Furthermore, the cost of patented drugs over the past ten years
decreased compared to other industrialized nations. 129 Even though NAFTA
required stricter patent protection for pharmaceuticals, Canada has been
successful in keeping its drug costs down.
Although the powers of the PMPRB increased because of NAFTA, the
PMPRB is still not as comprehensive as the PBS in providing access to
affordable medicines because it does not regulate prices of generic
122 id.
123 Carter, supra note 78, at 247.
24 PMPRB FAQ's, supra note 80.
125 id.
126 See JOHN R. GRAHAM, THE FRASER INSTITUTE, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES IN CANADA AND THE
UNITED STATES-PART 2: WHY THE DIFFERENCE? (Sep. 2000) available at http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/
shared/readmore.asp?sNav=pb&id=161 (last visited May 31, 2005).
127 See Price Control Report, supra note 1 (describing how the PMPRB caps act as a ceiling and even
lowers prices). A gate price is the price at which the manufacturer sells to wholesalers, hospitals, or
pharmacies. See ABOUT THE PMPRB, supra note 104.
128 GRAHAM, supra note 126.
129 PMPRB FAQ'S, supra note 80.
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medicines.' 30  The substantive changes to Canadian law were more
significant than the changes to the PBS, suggesting that the PBS is more
likely to continue controlling drug prices.
IV. THE U.S.-AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WILL NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT AUSTRALIAN PATENTED DRUG PRICES
In comparison to the substantive changes that the Canadian trade
agreements provoked in Canadian patent and licensing laws, the U.S.-
Australia FTA resulted in minor procedural changes to the PBS. These
changes should not significantly impact Australian drug prices. The
Australian government has stated that most of the provisions in the U.S.-
Australia FTA agreement dictate practices that PBAC already follows when
it considers listing a new medication. 13  The U.S.-Australia FTA addresses
pharmaceuticals in its Annex 2-C, which outlines Agreed Principles,
Transparency, Medicines Working Group, Regulatory Cooperation, and
Dissemination of Information.' 32 None of these categories, or their subparts,
compels the elimination of the PBS, or even hinders its effectiveness. In
fact, some of the principles will improve the efficiency of the PBS.
The U.S.-Australia ETA provisions regarding transparency focus on
making the PBS process for listing and pricing more transparent and
expeditious for an applicant. 133 The U.S.-Australia FTA requires procedures
that protect patents by preventing a generic drug manufacturer from
marketing during the patent term and requires the generic drug manufacturer
to provide notice to the patent holder when it intends to challenge a patent.
1 34
These measures do not change a generic drug manufacturer's ability to
130 id.
131 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA-UNITED
STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BACKGROUNDERS, THE AUSTRALIA-UNTED STATES FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME (PBS) OUTCOMES, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/
trade/negotiations/usjftalbackgrounder/pbs.html (last visited May 31, 2005; copy on file with Journal)
[hereinafter PBS OUTCOMES]. Mark Vaile, the Australian Minister for Trade, has further declared that "the
detail[s] of implementation remains at Australia's discretion-not America's-thus protecting the PBS."
Media Release, The Honorable Mark Vaile, MP, Minister for Trade, The AUSFTA, PBS and Access to
Medicines, May 21, 2004, at http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2004/mvt036_04.html (last visited
May 31, 2005).
132 United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, U.S.-AustI., Annex 2-C §§ 1-5,
available at http://www.ustr.govlrrade.Agreements/Bilateral/Australia.FrA/Final-Text/Section_
Index.htmil (last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter Annex 2-C].
133 See Economic Analysis, supra note 21.
134 USTR, SUMMARY OF THE U.S.-AuSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, FREE TRADE "DOWN
UNDER" (Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document-LibraryIFact-Sheets/2004/
Summary ofthe_U.S.-AustraliaFree_TradeAgreement.html (last visited May 31, 2005).
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springboard. 35 The continued existence of the PBS and Australia's power to
interpret the provisions of the U.S.-Australia FTA will ensure drug prices
remain low for Australians.
A. The Agreed Principles Do Not Change How the PBS Operates
The four Agreed Principles of the U.S.-Australia FTA reflect a
compromise between the two nations' market philosophies: universal access
versus competitive access. The first principle states that innovative
pharmaceuticals play an important role in delivering high-quality health
care.136 The pharmaceutical programs of both nations reflect this principle,
even though each nation approaches delivery differently. The second
principle pronounces the important role of research and development in
creating new medicines and calls for appropriate government support such
as intellectual property protection.' 37  In the third principle, the nations
agreed upon a need for "transparent, expeditious and accountable
procedures" in order to promote timely and affordable access to innovative
medicines.1 38 These procedures should not impede either nation's ability to
enforce its appropriate standards of quality, safety and efficacy. Finally, the
fourth principle is an explicit acceptance of both market philosophies. It
declares the need to value innovative pharmaceuticals either by competition
(as in the United States), or by procedures that place a value on the
therapeutic significance of the drug (as in Australia through the PBS).13 9
The principles themselves do not eliminate or otherwise destroy the basis of
the PBS. In fact, the fourth principle explicitly affirms the PBS's role.'
40
B. The U.S. -Australia FTA Primarily Made Procedural Changes to the
PBS
Unlike the substantive changes to Canadian patent law under its free
trade agreements, the changes produced by the U.S.-Australia FTA in
Australia are less significant because they are merely procedural. The
changes to the PBS are enumerated under the Transparency section of Annex
2-C of Chapter 2, National Treatment and Market Access for Goods, of the
115 PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22.
136 See Annex 2-C, supra note 132, § 1(a).
137 ld. §lI(b).
138 The Transparency section of the FTA expounds on this principle and will be discussed in more
detail in Part IV.B infra.
139 Annex 2-C, supra note 132, §l(d).
140 id.
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U.S.-ustrlia T142U.S.-Australia FTA14 1and in side letters to the agreement. 4 2  The
transparency provisions apply to federal healthcare authorities that list
pharmaceuticals or set reimbursement rates for them.' 43 Since the United
States does not have a federal program that performs this function,' 44 the
provisions apply only to Australia's PBS. The side letters make this clear. 45
All of the transparency provisions require certain procedural
safeguards and focus on making the program operate with "transparent,
expeditious, and accountable procedures."' 146  To expedite the process of
listing with the PBS, the first provision calls for PBAC to review drug
sponsors' applications within a "specified time.' 47 A PBAC report released
in July 2004, outlined recommendations that would reduce the time it takes
for a drug to be listed with the PBS. 48 This means consumers will have
access to medicines faster-a benefit to Australians. 14 9 This will also benefit
manufacturers because they will be able to sell their product sooner. This
provision of the U.S.-Australia FTA does not result in price increases or
decreased access to medicines.
The next set of provisions aims to increase transparency by requiring
the disclosure of "procedural rules, methodologies, principles and
guidelines" that the PBS uses in reviewing applications.1 50  PBAC reviews
applications on a case-by-case basis without distinction to whether the drug
141 Id. §2;
142 Letter from The Honorable Robert B. Zoelick, United States Trade Representative, to The
Honorable Mark Vaile, Minister of Trade (May 18, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/AustraliaFTA/FinalText/asset upload-file840_3886.pdf [hereinafter Letter
from Zoelick]. The letter explains that both governments consider the letter "an integral part of the
Agreement." Id.
143 Annex 2-C, supra note 132, §2.
:44 See supra note 8, and accompanying text.
45 Letter from Zoelick, supra note 142.
146 Annex 2-C, supra note 132, §l(c).
147 A specific timeframe was not determined by the FTA. In the first post-FTA Policies, Procedures,
and Methods Manual of the Pricing Authority, the timeframe for listing and pricing was established as four
months for the PBAC and five months for the Pricing Authority, for a total of nine months. See
PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS PRICING AUTHORITY POLICIES PROCEDURES AND METHODS USED IN THE
PRICING OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS (Jan. 24, 2005), available at http://www.health.gov.au/intemet/
wcms/publishing.nsf/Content/health-pbs-general-pricing-pbpamethods.htm/$FLE/pbpamethods.pdf (last
visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter PRICING AUTHORITY POLICIES].
148 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING, NEW PBS MEDICINES AVAILABLE FASTER: REPORT PLAN,
available at http://www.health.gov.au/intemet/wcms/publishing.nsf/Content/health-mediarel-yr2004-ta-
abb122.htm (last visited May 31, 2005) (claiming that the timeframe, which was five months at the time of
the report, will be significantly reduced).
See DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA-UNTED STATES FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT, GUIDE TO THE AGREEMENT, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/usfta/
guide/2.html (last visited May 31, 2005).
"o Annex 2-C, supra note 132, §2(b).
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is essential or non-essential. 151 By forcing the disclosure of the criteria for
review, this U.S.-Australia FTA provision will enable applicants to present
relevant information in the best way possible. This, in turn, will assist the
PBAC in making its decision and creating a more efficient process.
Furthermore, applicants will be provided detailed written information
regarding the basis for PBAC and Pricing Authority decisions. 112 Although
the Pricing Authority has already released its decision-making criteria,153 the
detailed report describing the basis for the listing and pricing decisions will
be helpful to the applicant and will also improve efficiency.
A more substantial change, but still only a procedural one, is a new
independent review process mandated by the U.S.-Australia FTA that will
benefit the applicant and the public. 54 This process provides for a review,
independent of the PBS and by a new entity, of adverse PBAC listing
determinations, upon request from the drug's sponsor.155  This review
process will provide the sponsor with more information about the PBAC
decision, including a detailed explanation of the PBAC's reasoning in
rejecting the sponsor's application.' 56  The U.S.-Australia FTA does not
make the review process binding, but it does provide an opportunity for the
manufacturer to provide additional input during the drug's assessment and
subsequent recommendation to the Pricing Authority.' 57 This will increase
transparency of the PBS process of listing and pricing a drug because the
reasoning behind PBAC decisions will become publicly available. 158  The
Australian Department of Health and Ageing ("Department") released
details regarding its implementation of this new review process on February
4, 2005."9 In the release, the Department asserted that the PBS will not only
keep drug prices low, but will be "more accountable and transparent for all
151 See RICKARD, supra note 2. "PBAC does not employ any formal definitions or criteria for the
distinction." Id.
152 Annex 2-C, supra note 132, §2(d).
153 See PRICING AUTHORITY POLICIES, supra note 147.
15 Annex 2-C, supra note 132, §2(f).
155 Letter from Zoelick, supra note 142.
156 See Economic Analysis, supra note 21; PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22.
157 PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22.
158 See Media Release, The Honorable Mark Valle, MP, Minister for Trade, Australia-United States
FTA No Threat to PBS (July 25, 2004), available at http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2004/
mvt064_04.html (last visited May 31, 2005); Annex 2-C, supra note 132, §2(e) (noting that the confidential
information of the application will be protected from the public).
159 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING, AuSTRALIA-UNITED STATES
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL BENEFITS SCHEME (Feb. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.health.gov.au/intemet/wcms/publishing.nsf/Contenthealth-mediarel-yr2005-ta-abbOO8.htm
(last visited May 31, 2005) [hereinafter FTA AND THE PBS].
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stakeholders in the PBS."16 Thus, the Transparency provision will benefit
not only the applicants, but also the public.
Secondly, in order to enhance transparency, meaningful consultation,
and accountability of the PBS, the U.S.-Australia FTA provides for
opportunities for the applicant to interact with the PBS on four points:
(a) an opportunity to consult relevant officials prior to
submission of an application for listing, including on the
selection of a comparator pharmaceutical; (b) an opportunity to
respond fully to reports or evaluations relating to the
applications that are prepared for the technical subcommittees
of the [PBAC]; (c) an opportunity for a hearing before PBAC
while it is considering reports or advice from the technical
subcommittees to the PBAC regarding applications; and (d)
sufficient information on the reasons for PBAC's determination
on an application, on an expeditious basis, to facilitate any
application to the [Pricing Authority]. 161
These opportunities are valuable because they will facilitate communication
between an applicant and the PBS. The applicant will have opportunities to
discuss the application throughout the PBS process, and PBS will be able to
obtain more accurate and complete information. This may lead to a more
efficient PBS.
Unlike the Canadian trade agreements provisions, which focused on
changing substantive laws of Canada, the provisions of the U.S.-Australian
FTA require merely procedural changes aimed at improving communication.
Importantly, although there are increased opportunities for applicants to offer
more information to the PBS, the U.S.-Australia FTA did not change the
criteria by which the Pricing Authority evaluates new drugs. 6 2 Further, the
transparency provisions serve only to supply PBS decision makers and the
public with information consistent with the pre- U.S.-Australia FTA review
criteria.
160 id.
161 Letter from Zoelick, supra note 142.
162 Compare PBPA ANN. REP., supra note 53, at 4 ("Factors considered by the Authority" lists factors
a-i), with PRICING AUTHORrrY PoLIcIEs, supra note 147, at 8 ("Factors Considered by the Pricing
Authority" lists same factors a-i).
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C. Australian Consumers Will Continue to Enjoy Timely Access to
Generics
The U.S.-Australia FTA created minor changes to intellectual property
rights of drug manufacturers, but Australian consumers will still have timely
access to generics. 163  Before the U.S.-Australian FTA, a generic drug
applicant had to wait five years from the patented drug's original approval
date before applying to the Therapeutic Goods Administration for marketing
approval.1 64 This delay was called the data exclusivity period. 165 Before the
U.S.-Australia FTA, the Therapeutic Goods Administration did not consider
the status of a patent when reviewing the generic drug applicant.' 66 The
generic drug manufacturer was permitted to complete the steps for listing
and pricing before the patent expired, but was not allowed to actually
manufacture the drug while the patent was still in effect. 16 7  In some
circumstances, however, the generic drug producer decided to manufacture
and enter the market before the patent expired to see if the patent holder
would take action. 168  In such a case, the generic drug producer could
challenge the patent or argue that there was no infringement, but it would
have already entered the market and infringed on the patent holder's rights.
The U.S.-Australia FTA made a small change to this process that somewhat
favors the patent holder.
Before the U.S.-Australia FTA, a generic drug producer could apply to
springboard and get marketing approval from the Therapeutic Goods
Administration by using the patent holder's test data. 169 This continues to be
true after the U.S.-Australia FTA. Before the U.S.-Australia RITA, the
Therapeutic Goods Administration did not consider the status of the patent
when reviewing the generic drug applicant. 170  This has changed. The
generic drug applicant must meet a new certification requirement. 171  To
meet the certification measure, the generic drug manufacturer must either:
(1) attest that it reasonably believes that it does not and will not market in a
163 PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22.
:64 TYACKE, supra note 64.
'65 PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22.
166 id.
'67 See Christine Wallace & Roy Eccleston, US Using FTA in Backdoor Attempt to Wind Back
Generic Drugs, THE AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 18, 2003 at 2; Moscaritolo & Starick, supra note 70.
161 PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22.
169 See supra Part I.C.
170 id.
171 United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, U.S.-Austl., § 17.10.4, available at
http://www.ustr.govrradeAgreements/Bilateral/AustraliaFrA/FinalText/Section_lndex.html (last
visited May 31, 2005).
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manner that would infringe on the patent holder's rights, or; (2) attest that
the applicant intends to market before the patent expires, but has given
notice to the patent holder of their PBS application.' 72  Once the generic
drug manufacturer certifies that it has met one of these options, it can take
advantage of the original applicant's research and test data proving its safety,
efficacy, and quality.
73
Some fear that the new certification process opens the door to
litigation between the patent holder and the generic drug applicant, leading
to a delay in generics reaching the market and an increase in the costs of
pharmaceuticals to consumers. 174  However, this is unlikely. The
requirement of the certification process is similar to the "notice of
compliance" ("NOC") that Canada implemented. 175 It essentially requires
the applicant to either agree that the drug has a legitimate outstanding patent
holder, or notify the patent holder of its belief that infringement on the patent
holder's rights will not occur.176 The NOC process determines the status of
the relevant patents before a generic drug manufacturer infringes on the
patent holder's rights.177 Similarly, the new certification process in Australia
is an easy step for a generic drug manufacturer to meet, and can help avoid
litigation by obtaining a determination of the patent status before
infringement occurs.
D. The New Medicines Working Group Has No Impact on the PBS
The U.S.-Australia FTA calls for the formation of a new bilateral
Medicines Working Group. 178  This Working Group will discuss issues
relating to pharmaceuticals and the U.S.-Australia FTA provisions that relate
172 See AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING, AMENDMENTS TO THE
THERAPEUTIC GOODS ACT 1989, available at http://www.tga.gov.au/international/usfta.htm (last visited
May 31, 2005). See also AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND AGEING,
CERTIFICATION IN RELATION TO PATENTS, available at http://www.tga.gov.au/intemational/
usftacert26b.pdf (last visited May 31, 2005) (the approved form for subsection 26(B)1 of the Therapeutic
Goods Act 1989).
171 PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22.
174 Id. See also Peter Drahos, Our PBS Bill Will be Higher if FTA Goes Ahead, CANBERRA TIMES,
May 31, 2004, at 12 (quoting the Generic Medicines Industry Association and alleging that FFA provisions
may "delay rapid generic entry on to the PBS and drive up its costs to the taxpayers").
175 See Evolution of Canadian Law, supra note 76, at *10-15 (explaining that the Notice of
Compliance was implemented in the same legislation as the other NAFTA changes).
176 See Anita Nador & Melanie Szweras, Comparing Canadian Notice of Compliance (NOC)
Regulations for Patented Medicines with Corresponding United States and European Union Provisions
(Mar. 4, 2002), available at http://www.bereskinparr.conpublications/art-html/bio-noc-regul-nador.htmi
(last visited May 31, 2005).
177 See id.
178 Annex 2-C, supra note 132, §3.
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to pharmaceuticals. 179 Appropriate government officials will serve on the
Working Group.180 The skepticism surrounding the Working Group is based
on the lack of details about its operation. 181 What is important, however, is
that the Working Group is similar to other inter-party groups created under
the U.S.-Australia FTA and therefore is not a policy making body, but rather
a discussion forum.'8 2 This forum may allow the parties to avoid disputes
concerning the U.S.-Australia FTA by discussing interpretations in the
Working Group.
Similarly, under the provisions for Regulatory Cooperation, the U.S.-
Australia FTA calls for existing dialogue to continue between the two
nations' regulatory arms that review the safety and efficacy of
pharmaceuticals-the Therapeutic Goods Administration and the U.S. Food
& Drug Administration. i1 3 This dialogue has "a view to making innovative
medical products more quickly available to their nationals."' 84 This does not
imply that the PBS is in jeopardy because the Food & Drug Administration
and Therapeutic Goods Administration have already engaged in discussion,
and consumers from both nations benefit from the discussions, which aim to
make medicines available sooner. The concern of some Australians,
however, is that the requirement of the dialogue implies that research and
development are more important than affordable access (assuming that
research and development enable quick availability of innovative
medicines). The Therapeutic Goods Administration can counter that
interpretation of the requirement for inter-agency dialogue by stressing the
importance of financial access once the medicines have been developed.
Research and development is part of what makes innovative medicines
physically available to consumers, but availability includes economic access,
which is dependent on the affordability of medicines. Hence, this part of the
U.S.-Australia FTA should not hinder the PBS in meeting its mission.'
85
179 Id. §3(b).
18o See PBS OUTCOMES, supra note 131.
... See DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, supra note 149, at *5 (noting that details
concerning how it will operate and how often it will meet have not been decided). See also Ken Harvey,
Pharmaceutical benefits and free trade: trouble ahead for subsidised medicines in Australia? (Mar. 19,
2004), available at http://www.econ.usyd.edu.au/drawingboard/digest/0403/harvey.htrnl (last visited May
31, 2005) (discussing that the United States and Australia have different views of the working group which
causes concerns).
18 See PBS OUTCOMES, supra note 131; Harvey, supra note 181.
183 Annex 2-C, supra note 132, §4.
184 id.
185 The final clause in the FIA concerns the dissemination of information. Id. §5. It did not change
any Australian laws. See PBS OUTCOMES, supra note 131.
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E. The Continued Authority of the PBS and the Influence of Australian
Public Opinion Will Ensure That the Price of Medicines Will Not Be
Significantly Impacted by the U.S. -Australia FTA
The continued existence of the PBS, combined with the Australian
people's sense of entitlement to affordable medicines, will keep
pharmaceutical prices low. The PBS, like the Canadian PMPRB, is intended
to keep down the prices of patented medicines.1 86 Unlike the PMPRB, the
PBS has power to negotiate prices for generic drugs and set consumer prices
for all pharmaceuticals. 87 As is the case with the PMPRB in the post-
NAFTA years, the PBS will successfully control pharmaceutical prices post-
U.S.-Australia FTA. Several factors support this prediction.
First, the U.S.-Australia FTA did not dismantle the PBS, change how
it lists or prices drugs, or diminish its power to do so. 188 The PBS still
considers the therapeutic value of a drug in setting prices. 189 The PBS does
not focus on the cost of developing a drug, but instead on what it is worth to
its citizens. 190  The subsidization program dismisses research and
development costs when it sets prices. 19' As long as the program exists, and
as long as drugs are subsidized, drug manufacturers will continue to seek
subsidization and perpetuate the power of the PBS to control prices. In
order to compete in the artificial Australian market, the drug must have an
artificial price-a subsidized price.
Second, the Australian government and citizens are too protective of
the PBS to allow the U.S.-Australia FTA to materially alter its program or
benefits. During the negotiations of the U.S.-Australia FTA, the Australian
citizens were particularly vocal in their support for protecting the power of
the PBS to regulate drug prices. 92 For example, one group, comprised of
representatives from more than two dozen leading medical, legal, health, and
community services organizations, sent a twenty-six page document to
Prime Minister John Howard and Mark Latham, the Federal Labour Party
Leader, claiming that the U.S.-Australia FTA would allow U.S. drug
companies to challenge the PBS, and demanding changes to the
1:8 See supra Part I.A.
87 Compare PBS & AUSFTA, supra note 22, with Carter, supra note 78, at 247.
188 See FTA AND THE PBS, supra note 159.
'89 See PRICING AUTHORrY POLICIES, supra note 147, at 8.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Despite the concerns, the Australian government remained confident that the FTA would not
impact the PBS. See, e.g., Economic Analysis, supra note 21 (discussing how the PBS was not included in
the economic impact study because the government believes the FrA will not impact the PBS or the price
of drugs in Australia).
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agreement. 193  Another letter, signed by 380 academics from across
Australia, demanded more honesty and independence from the
government. 194  The concerns over the U.S.-Australia FTA ranged from
dispute resolution to generic drug entry, and from drug companies ending
research and development of drugs in Australia to rising drug prices.' 95 This
public outcry did not go unnoticed by the Australian government. In fact
Prime Minister Howard, nervous about re-election, responded to the pressure
by pushing through parliament a change to the U.S.-Australia F-A enabling
legislation that was later amended to comply with the U.S.-Australia FTA.
196
V. CONCLUSION
Although there are ongoing concerns that the United States-Australia
Free Trade Agreement may adversely impact prices of pharmaceuticals in
Australia, the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement requirements will not
significantly affect the pricing scheme. As in Canada, where the Patented
Medicine Prices Review Board effectively limits the price of patented
pharmaceuticals in the years since NAFrA was implemented, the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme in Australia will likely be able to
effectively manage the price of drugs for its citizens in the post-U.S.-
Australia Free Trade Agreement era. The changes the United States trade
agreements made to the Canadian system were more significant than the
changes the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement requires of Australia, and
Canada has been able to keep prices under control. The public support in
Australia for the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme will continue to play an
important role in its power to list and price innovative drugs.
193 Pirani, supra note 45.
194 id.
195 See, e.g., id.; Drahos, supra note 174 (expressing concern that generic drugs will be delayed);
Australian Associated Press, Australia May Bow to Drug Firm's Demands, Oct. 22, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News Group File (discussing how the aim to keep drug prices low may be undermined by the
lobbying efforts of the pharmaceutical companies); Drug Prices to Rise Under FTA, SBS NEWS MEDIA,
Jul. 22, 2004, available at http://www9.sbs.com.au/theworldnews/region.php?id=89863&region=7 (last
visited May 31, 2005) (reporting that an Australian National University report says drug prices will rise
under the agreement); Kevin Outterson, Free Trade in Pharmaceuticals (Jul. 25, 2004), available at
http://www.mja.com.au/public/rop/ausfta/out10366-fm.htnl (last visited May 31, 2005) (generally arguing
that the focus of the FTA is on pharmaceutical companies rather than consumers and may harm the PBS);
Frenkel supra note 14, at 5 (alleging that consumers as taxpayers or patients will have to pay more because
of the new independent review process and the Medicines Working Group).
'96 See Press Release, USTR, Landmark U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement Goes Into Effect
Today (Jan. 1, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentjLibrary/Press-Releases/2005/January/Lmark_U.S.-
AustraliaFreeTrade-Agreement_Goes-Into-Effect-Today.html (describing that although Australia had
passed implementing legislation in August 2004, it had to pass more legislation in December 2004 to meet
the intellectual property provisions of the FTA).
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